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approach to information gathering that used many of the same tools as everyday life 
social search. The results of this study should help businesses and individuals better 
understand the risk of posting information in public forums.  
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Introduction 
The world today is a mesh of people, products, and information. The availability 
of online information has increased exponentially since the advent of the World Wide 
Web in 1989, and continues to grow as the world is introduced to new technologies and 
new capabilities to store and transmit information. With the growth of the web, however, 
also came the growth of cybercrime. 
Cybercrime is defined as any criminal act involving computers and networks 
(called hacking) and also includes traditional crimes conducted through the internet 
(Beal, 2016). The allure of cybercrime for criminals lies in the difficulty of attribution. 
Attribution can best be described as “determining the identity or location of an attacker or 
an attacker’s intermediary” (Wheeler, Larsen, Leader, 2003).  Thanks to the ability to 
mask one’s source address on the internet and the lack of a globalized effort to stop 
cybercrime, the arrest rates for cybercrimes are significantly lower than those of 
traditional, non-computer based, crimes. In 2010 over 300,000 internet crime complaints 
were received by the Department of Justice’s Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3),which resulted in only 31 arrests and 6 convictions (2010).  The 2014 IC3 reported 
a total monetary loss of $800,492,073 with an average of $6,472 dollars lost per 
complaint reporting a loss. This means that cyber criminals can make thousands of 
dollars illegally from the comforts of their own homes or even at a local coffee shop. 
With the likelihood of prosecution being so low, people and organizations must take steps 
in order to protect themselves from cybercriminals in order to better ensure they do not 
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become victims. This can be difficult, however, as the surge of information 
availability and requirements for social availability require people to publish more 
information about themselves online.  
As a result of the increased availability of online information, the ease with which 
information about people can be found has also changed. Simple searches for products 
can return millions of similar results and the onus is on the searcher to find the solution 
that is best for them. In order to facilitate this selection, however, the information owner 
takes steps to improve their chances of being selected. In terms of marketing this means 
that companies need to ensure that they have the information online that sways a 
consumer in their direction. A simple search for a high school friend on social media 
might return thousands of people with the same name. In order to make searching easier, 
people must add additional data to narrow the search. Information such as their friend’s 
hometown, where they went to school, and places they’ve worked are stored in the 
website’s database and used to make people easier to find. Employers seeking the best 
possible candidates publish information about the workplace online: technologies used, 
company contact information, programming languages used, etc. In order to be successful 
in the maelstrom of information that is the web, people and organizations must provide 
enough information about themselves to be unique, and make sure that information is 
readily available.  
Being available on the web, however, also means being available to 
cybercriminals. While technology has created multiple ways to exploit a system, the 
easiest way is still by exploiting a person directly (Mitnick 2002, Ch.1). Social 
engineering techniques are designed to do just that. In their infant phase Social 
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Engineering techniques attempted to get personal information from unsuspecting victims. 
Attackers would call, impersonating a person’s bank, for example, and request that a user 
“authenticate” themselves in order to get their banking information. Since then phishing 
and spear-phishing campaigns have evolved into very deliberate and targeted attacks. 
Revisiting the examples above, it is easy to see how this is made possible. The 
information the marketing team shares can be used to craft attacks against customers. 
This is especially true if the organization is known to send out marketing emails. Making 
information available to the public on social media means that attackers can get to know 
a person, almost on a personal level, without ever actually meeting them. Overly 
descriptive job postings allow specific attacks that target vulnerabilities in technologies 
that a company uses. Most organizations write security policies and invest in security 
services and applications in order to meet security requirements. Many recognize a need 
to test their security policies and procedures in order to ensure that their procedures are 
working and their employees will not be exploited. Instead of waiting for a real life event, 
these companies will request the services of an ethical hacker. Ethical hackers are people 
who hack into computer networks in order to test or evaluate their security, rather than 
with malicious or criminal intent (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). Ethical hackers are trained 
to emulate the techniques of cybercriminals and are used to test an organization’s 
defenses. Ethical hackers allow organizations to validate their security practices, but not 
without limitations.  
The greatest benefit of ethical hacking that it is done by a trusted agent and not a 
criminal, is also its greatest weakness: they are operating under the confines of the law. 
Even assuming that an ethical hacker’s knowledge and skills are equal to his or her 
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cybercriminal counterpart, the ethical hacker must perform under restrictions that the 
cybercriminal does not. Ethical hackers face limitations to scope, time, access, and 
methods (Limitations of Penetration Testing, 2016). Ethical hackers must perform their 
assessments only on the systems defined by their customers. This means, unlike 
cybercriminals, the people and systems that are easiest to exploit may be unavailable 
during their assessment. This is especially important in Social Engineering during ethical 
hacking where end-user privacy may be an issue (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2008) 
Despite these limitations, however, ethical hacking still provides the best means for 
companies to test their security practices, and the search strategies used by ethical 
hackers provide a best approximation of the strategies used by cybercriminals.  
 Currently there exists ample research on everyday information seeking strategies 
for various groups. However, little research has been done that addresses the information 
search strategies involved in cybercrime. This is likely due to the difficulty of reaching 
cybercriminals for research purposes and the novelty of cybersecurity in the realm of 
information science. This study seeks to fill the gap in current research and to begin 
identifying the information seeking behaviors of cybercriminals. By interviewing ethical 
hackers and reviewing existing literature it will seek to answer the following question: 
What techniques do ethical hackers use when seeking information to identify and exploit 
their targets? The scope of this question will be limited to Social Engineering based 
attacks.  
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Literature Review 
This chapter looks at existing literature and documentation surrounding Social 
Engineering and social search. It begins by defining Social Engineering and the steps of 
the Social Engineering attack cycle in order to better define the actions and motivations 
for Social Engineers. Both the technical and psychological aspects of Social Engineering 
and hacker searching are addressed before a brief comparison to Social Engineering 
social search and everyday life information seeking social search. The goal of this 
discussion is to fully define Social Engineering and to begin exploring techniques Social 
Engineers may use to complete their tasks.  
Social Engineering 
Mitnick and Simon (2002) define Social Engineering as the use of “influence and 
persuasion to deceive people by convincing them that the Social Engineer is someone he 
is not, or by manipulation…to obtain information…with or without the use of 
technology”(iv) . The goal of Social Engineering is to bypass the need to hack complex 
security systems by instead targeting the individuals who use the systems or can provide 
the information contained within. While Social Engineering attacks can be very technical 
in nature they are rooted in psychological concepts of influence and deception.  
The Social Engineering attack cycle is comprised of four stages: information 
gathering, relationship development, exploitation and execution (Allen, 2006). While the 
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focus of this research is the information gathering phase of the attack, all phases 
must be described in order to fully understand the motives in phase one. 
Information Gathering 
This phase is commonly referred to as the reconnaissance phase. It is during this 
phase that the attacker attempts to gather information about the victim. This phase creates 
the foundation for the rest of the attack, as the information gathered will need to be 
sufficient enough to build the trust relationship in phase two. There are multiple methods 
attackers can use to gather information about their victims; these techniques are usually 
done without contacting the individual directly. Hadnagy (2010) describes some of the 
ways attackers gather information. These include, but are not limited to, using online 
search engines, social media, and dumpster diving. These topics are introduced here and 
will be expounded upon in greater detail in the section on Social Engineering search 
strategies.  
Search Engines 
The most widely known use of search engines for reconnaissance is through 
Google hacking. Google hacking is a technique where the hacker attempts to gather 
information about a user or organization through google searches. Using complex 
searches in Google, the attacker is able to search company websites for files, email 
addresses, other contact information, etc. Long, Gardner and Brown (2011) outline 
multiple Google hacking techniques and give a detailed overview of how to complete 
these tasks.  
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Social Media 
Social media websites present a venue for people to connect with one another and, 
according to Rosenblum (2007), have become the “preferred forum for social 
interactions” (40). Social media sites contain information about a person’s likes and 
interests, places they’ve visited or visit frequently, pictures of them and their family, etc. 
This provides a wealth of information for the attacker to build an attack profile with 
information that will help them build rapport. Multiple studies have been done that show 
the risks of social networking focusing primarily on privacy concerns (Krishnamurthy, 
2013, Rosenblum, 2007). Studies have also shown the effects of social media on self-
disclosure (Stutzman, Gross and Acquisti, 2013).  
Dumpster Diving 
One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. The objective of dumpster diving is to 
find sensitive information that has not been properly discarded. This includes invoices, 
letters, CDs, USB Keys and sometimes even computers (Hadnagy, 2010). It is even 
possible in some cases to reconstruct documents that have been shredded especially if the 
document has been shredded one way.  
 
Relationship development  
During the relationship development phase, the attacker attempts to establish trust 
between themselves and their victim. At its core the trust is built on psychological 
principles.  The most frequent citations in psychology and Social Engineering literature 
are made to Cialdini’s “Influence: Science and Practice” (2001). Cialdini found 6 
principles of influence that help determine the likelihood that someone will “comply with 
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a request” (see Table 1). According to Mitnick and Simon (2002), Social Engineers use 
these principles in their attempts to manipulate their victims. These principles, as well as 
Social Engineering applications, are listed in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Principles of Influence/Social Engineering 
Principle  Cialdini (2001): 
Summarized Description 
Example Summarized by Mitnick and 
Simon (2002)  
Consistency  People feel obligated to follow 
through with commitments.  
A Social Engineer calls the victim and, 
after reminding them of their agreement to 
follow company policies, advises them on 
a strong-password technique that actually 
makes it easier for the Social Engineer to 
guess future passwords. The victim is more 
likely to comply in order to stay consistent 
with company policies. 
 
Reciprocation People feel they should repay 
debts and return favors.  
A Social Engineer calls the victim 
pretending to be within the company in 
offering to help them secure their system 
from a made up risk. In a follow up call the 
Social Engineer asks the victim to install 
some malware disguised as security 
software. The victim is more likely to 
comply since the Social Engineer has 
recently helped them. 
 
Social Proof People’s perceptions of what 
is right can be strongly 
influenced by the extent to 
which others around them 
view it as right.  
A Social Engineer calls the victim with a 
survey and convinces the victim that other 
members of the staff have already 
participated. Despite the survey revealing 
sensitive information about the victim they 
participate because they believe others 
have. 
 
Authority  People are more likely to 
comply with someone whom 
we perceive in a position of 
authority 
 
A Social Engineer can obtain authority by 
pretending to be a member of the IT 
department or an executive. 
 
Liking People are more likely to 
agree with/assist someone that 
they like 
A Social Engineer uses information on the 
victim to fake a similar interest in order to 
make himself more likable. 
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Principle  Cialdini (2001): 
Summarized Description 
Example Summarized by Mitnick and 
Simon (2002)  
Scarcity People’s perception of value is 
influenced by the perceived 
rarity of an item  
A Social Engineer contacts the victim 
offering a limited availability prize for 
those who sign up with their website. The 
victim, enticed by the scarcity of the prize 
signs up and the attacker is able to gain 
sensitive information about the victim 
during the sign up.  
 
 
Exploitation and Attack 
The Social Engineer’s goal in the exploitation and the attack phase is to get the 
desired information or achieve the desired effect. This could be credit card numbers 
retrieved from a dumpster dive, or the installation of malicious software on a computer 
device. There is some overlap between the information gathering stage and the 
exploitation stage. Krombholz et al. (2013) define Social Engineering attacks as being 
multi-faceted and including: “physical, social, and technical aspects which are used in 
different stages of the actual attack” (29). 
Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks include dumpster diving, shoulder surfing, where an attacker 
gathers information by watching an unknowing victim enter information into a 
computing system, and other approaches. The important factor of a physical approach is 
that it is done in person and is not usually technology mediated (Krombholz et al., 2013).  
Social Attacks 
Social attacks use the psychological principles detailed in Table 1 in order to get a 
desired effect. These can also be combined with technical approaches.  
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Technical attacks 
Technical attacks are ones that do not require direct contact with the victim and 
instead are mediated by computing systems (Krombholz et al., 2013). The most common 
technical attack is the phishing email. These emails, designed with rapport building in 
mind, trick the user into clicking a malicious link or replying with sensitive information. 
In many cases the goal of Social Engineering is not simply to gain information but also to 
gain access to computing systems that the victim may use. In these cases viruses and 
backdoors may be installed through phishing emails in order to perform other cyber-
attacks. 
Hacker Information Search  
As mentioned above, the majority of a hacker’s information searching is done 
during the information gathering phase. The next section reviews, in greater detail, the 
approaches used during this phase. Focus will be placed primarily on web based searches.   
Selecting a Victim 
Hacker information seeking begins by identifying a victim. In many cases, if a 
target company has been selected, then the search begins by using search engines to 
identify targets within the company. In some cases the Social Engineer started with an 
email list retrieved online (from sites like pastebin.com) or used a snowball technique 
attempting to attack contacts of another victim (Irani et al., 2011). While this selection 
varies is it important to realize that the rationale for these decisions may not be too 
different than those of other criminals. Dermot Walsh details the rationale behind an 
economic criminal’s selection of victims (Cornish and Clarke, 2014, 39-49). The 
principles of this text: risk, knowledge market, experience etc., also play a role in victim 
13 
 
 
 
selection for cybercriminals when searching for victims. Attackers will seek elderly 
people, for example, to minimize risk because they are less likely to report (FBI, 2016).  
Once a victim has been selected the next step is to find out as much information 
about them as possible to build a profile. This may not always be necessary, especially in 
the case of mass phishing emails, but as anti-phishing technology and Social Engineering 
user training become more efficient, the need for user specific attacks such as spear 
phishing also increases (Hong, 2012). Attackers have multiple avenues to gather more 
information about their victims, but with the wealth of information that can be found on 
social media, it is a common starting point.  
Research done on social media information gathering for Social Engineers has 
shown high success rates in building a successful phishing profile using data found on the 
victims’ profiles (Huber et al., 2009). This research has shown success automating the 
information gathering process and creating a realistic phishing profile using a bot. Huber 
et al.’s research took advantage of lax privacy settings and data mining techniques to 
create not only a profile but also a chat bot that was able to successfully solicit 
information from Facebook users. This demonstrates how legitimate functions of social 
media are used in nefarious ways to gain information. Another example of this can be 
found in Irani et al. (2011), where researchers realized that searching for a user by email 
address would likely recommend you as a friend to them and used that to encourage 
Facebook users to request their fake profile. Social engineers may also use tools to search 
multiple social media sites at once for their targets. An example of a commonly used tool 
for this is the open source intelligence (OSINT) gathering tool 
(https://inteltechniques.com/links.html)  developed by Bazzell (2014). Another common 
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tool used is Paterva’s Maltego (https://www.paterva.com/web7/) which allows a user to 
search for related content on the web and provides a graphical representation of the 
results (Bradbury, 2011).  An example from Maltego’s community edition (CE) can 
befound in Figure 1 below.  
 
Searching for Techniques 
Another aspect of Social Engineering information seeking is the search for 
training and other resources. A simple web search for Social Engineering techniques 
reveals a plethora of resources that can be used for training. There is also an abundance 
of training manuals (mostly designed for ethical hackers) that can be used by any Social 
Engineer to develop an attack. These resources include tips for all four phases of the 
Social Engineering attack cycle. However, just like the everyday information seeker 
would sometimes prefer to speak directly with an expert, Social Engineers also search for 
experts and exchange information amongst each other.  
Figure 1: Maltego CE 
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 Sarma and Matheus (2015) explore the social groups that exist for hackers.  This 
research focused on “a particular type of virtual community, the hybrid hacker 
community” (102) and discussed participation, knowledge generation and innovation 
focusing on factors including, but not limited to, technology, secrecy and membership 
fluidity. Moilanen (2012) defines hackerspaces as “autonomous micro-communities” that 
have both real and virtual bodies(112). Both of these articles examine spaces that exist 
for hackers to collaborate and share information as well as to stay current on hacker news 
and exploits, not unlike other hobbies. Certain aspects may change (an increase in the 
need for anonymity, for example), but others stay the same. Benjamin and Chen (2012) 
study the effects of reputation in online hacker communities. The importance of 
reputation found in this study means that cyberspaces have the equivalent of experts and 
attackers are able to identify experts based on their reputations.  
 The techniques that cyber criminals use are not too different from those used in 
everyday life information seeking. The next section reviews techniques used for everyday 
life information seeking (ELIS) and social search, and shows parallels between those 
techniques and the techniques used by cybercriminals. 
Everyday Life Information Seeking  
ELIS describes legitimate, non-work-related, information searches (Savolainen, 
1995). Important research has been conducted that shows not only the importance of the 
internet in ELIS (Savolainen and Kari, 2004), but also the important role of social 
network sites (Sin and Kim, 2013). Focus in this paper will be placed on the similarities 
between Social Engineering use of social networks and ELIS as it pertains to social 
search.  
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Not unlike Social Engineering, research has shown a high percentage of people 
rely on social networking sites for information seeking. Sin and Kim (2013) found that “x 
of the respondents (97%) had used social networking sites for ELIS”(4). Looking at these 
high values of usage it is increasingly clear why social media is used as both an 
information gathering tool and an attack surface. An important question, however, is how 
these users get their information and find connections, and how this differs from Social 
Engineering techniques.  
Adamic and Adar (2005) found that, in email networks, forwarded messages 
“reached most of their targets in a small number of steps, and using information about the 
target outperformed simply choosing the highest degree neighbor”(202). This is 
consistent with the Social Engineering technique of spear phishing in which a targeted 
email is sent to the victim. This technique, where individuals in small networks are able 
to quickly pass messages to “the individual most like the target” can also be used by 
Social Engineers by establishing trust with someone other than the victim and using that 
intermediary to create a relationship of trust with targets of interest. This technique is 
seen in reverse Social Engineering.  
Another study conducted at Michigan State University sought to examine the use 
of social media by students (Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, 2006). This study found that 
very few of the participants believed that “total strangers who [weren’t] affiliated with 
any college or school” (168) looked at their profiles. It also found that there was a 
relatively high likelihood of participants using social media to get information about 
people that live near them. A study on the usage of social network sites by higher 
education students in Turkey (Usluel, 2011) found similar results where the most positive 
17 
 
 
 
uses of social networks included gaining up-to-date information, learning new 
information and knowledge, and communicating frequently with peers. This is consistent 
with hacker communities’ use of social networking to stay abreast of techniques they can 
use in their exploits. Since users of social media do not expect strangers to contact them a 
well-crafted fake profile like the profile created in Irani et al. (2011) will likely pass as 
that of an interested peer who is reaching out. This information is consistent with Social 
Engineers’ use of social networks and explains the effectiveness of Social Engineering. 
Research done on expert search in social networks also shows similarities 
between normal ELIS and information seeking done by Social Engineers. Joung et al. 
(2013) found that an actor “with a high degree of connections…has a higher chance of 
knowing the answer.”(966) This is consistent with Benjamin and Chen (2012) and shows 
that in both instances users with higher reputations (in one case indicated by a high 
number of friends) are perceived as the best sources of information. It is also safe to 
assume, in the case of Social Engineering, that someone with a high number of friends is 
more likely to accept a new friend request. This means that similar search logic for 
finding experts online can be used to find victims. 
Summary 
Existing literature can be used to define social engineering and the social 
engineering attack cycle. Furthermore, the literature can be used to define some tools that 
can be used to complete the phases of the attack. This literature has been evaluated as 
well as literature to explore the psychological principles involved in social engineering. 
The different types of information that Social Engineers may gather have been explored 
and these information needs compared to ELIS social search.  The rest of this paper will 
18 
 
 
 
seek to fill a void in the literature and define the techniques Social Engineers use when 
seeking information to identify and exploit their targets
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Methods 
To complete this study, eight Social Engineers were selected for contextual 
interviews. The interviews were conducted online and recorded using screen sharing 
software. Participants were asked two-three social engineering scenarios and asked to 
show the researcher how they would complete the tasks required for each one. Appendix 
A details the full interview with the presented scenarios.  
Participants 
The intended population for this study are Social Engineers. Eight ethical hackers 
and penetration testers who use Social Engineering in their engagements were recruited 
to participate. The initial five participants were selected from penetration testers with 
whom the researcher has worked previously and already has a working relationship with. 
Snowball sampling was used from there (Wildemuth, 2009, 121). While it was possible 
to recruit based on ethical hacker listings, participation was likely to be higher if 
participants are referred by someone they trust. In order to help ensure anonymity no 
demographic data was collected however, it was noted that all participants were male. 
Interview  
The data for this study was collected using a semi-structured, open-ended 
interview. Questions were written ahead of time in order to facilitate the interview 
process and ensure that all of the planned interview topics were reviewed. Participants 
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were presented two to three scenarios and asked to show the researcher how they 
would gather information to complete the task for each one. Most participants chose to 
demonstrate on well-known company or one that they worked for. Some participants 
chose to target the researcher to show how they would gather their information. Appendix 
A contains complete interview guide used during the research.  
 
Table 2: Interview Scenarios 
Scenario 
Number 
Scenario Number of participants 
responding to each 
scenario 
1 Assume that you have been hired by a 
business to perform a penetration test and you 
are attempting to craft a spear phishing email 
targeting a specific user’s business email 
 
8 
2 Assume that you have been hired by a 
business to perform a penetration test and you 
are attempting craft a spear phishing email 
targeting a person’s personal email. 
 
3 
3 Assume that you have been hired by a 
business to perform a penetration test and you 
are attempting attempt to gain a person’s 
business credentials via the phone. 
 
6 
4 Assume that you have been hired by a 
business to perform a penetration test and you 
are attempting gather information about a 
person in order to target a family member. 
 
5 
 
Table 2, above, shows the breakdown of scenarios and the number of participants 
who responded to each scenario. Each scenario assumes the Social Engineer has been 
hired for by a business to complete a Social Engineering task. The differences lie in the 
final mechanism that will be used as the attack vector. In the first scenario, the Social 
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Engineer intends to target only the business emails, that is, emails that are owned by the 
company who has hired them for the penetration test. The second scenario asks the 
participant to target the personal emails of the company’s employees. This scenario was 
included to attempt to identify if the attacker would require different information to build 
trust with the user. In theory emails targeting business emails would be business centric 
whereas emails targeting a personal email would require more information about the 
target’s personal life. The third scenario takes the requirement for personalization even 
further and requires the Social Engineer to plan for a direct call to a user. During this call 
the Social Engineer is attempting to illicit the user’s username and passwords for a 
business asset over the phone. Theoretically this would require the Social Engineer to 
know enough about the target user and their acquaintances ahead of time in order to pass 
themselves off as a trusted agent. The final scenario is the most invasive and was selected 
due to the assumption that it would be off limits to ethical hacking personnel. In this 
scenario, instead of targeting employees of the business directly, the Social Engineer 
attempts to go through a family member first. This can be targeting the family member in 
order to gather more information about the actual target or in an attempt to use the family 
member to establish trust with the target and serve as a pivot point. 
Each participant was presented multiple scenarios with 50% responding to two 
and 50% responding to 3. Consequently, each of the scenarios from the interview guide 
was presented to multiple participants. Only scenario one was posed to all eight (see 
Table 2). Focus was placed on scenarios 3 and 4 as it seemed unlikely, based on 
participants’ answers to the first scenario, that scenario 2 would reveal any significant 
differences across participants.  
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Interviews were conducted online using GoToMeeting software. GoToMeeting 
allowed the researcher to record audio and all actions taken on the participant’s screen. 
The captured screen and audio data was saved in order to allow the researcher to review 
and analyze post interview.  
Data from the interviews was analyzed inductively and followed a conventional 
content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The interviews were not fully 
transcribed. Instead, the researcher took handwritten notes during the interview and 
reviewed the recordings for any information missed and to allow for more robust analysis 
in the areas in which initial notes were taken. Interview questions focused on search 
strategies used by the Social Engineer. Information about techniques, motives, and search 
issues was addressed. After each interview the collected data was reviewed and analyzed. 
The primary goal of this review was to list out the steps of the information gathering 
process as well as the tools/techniques used at each step. Additionally, the researcher 
searched for mentions of ethics/legality and any other themes that may have arisen from 
the dataset. The responses were compiled and compared to each other for similarities and 
differences. The ultimate goal of the interviews was to establish trends among the Social 
Engineers to discover what techniques are used most commonly amongst Social 
Engineers. 
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Results 
The purpose of this research was to identify information search strategies for 
Social Engineers. In order to do that contextual interviews with open-ended questions 
were asked in the form of a “Social Engineering scenario”; this chapter presents the 
results of these interviews. The breakdown of interview questions will be presented first, 
followed by key findings, a detailed search strategy breakdown, and, finally, the results 
of the participants’ answers to the question about their most common scenario.  
 
Key Findings 
The results of this research can be summarized into five key findings.  
1. There exists no noticeable difference between how different Social Engineers 
search for information between scenarios.  
2. There was a wide array of “most common scenarios;” however, they could be 
grouped into two main categories: scenarios focused on external business 
contacts, and scenarios targeting employees via business emails.  
3. Social Engineer search strategies can be defined as a semi-structured cyclic 
approach to their information with two steps: data discovery and data refinement.  
4. The primary search tools used by social engineers could be grouped into three 
types: social media searching, using search engines, and the use of specialized 
tools/websites.  
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5. Ethics and legality played a role in what some Social Engineers were willing to 
do. However, not all of them had the same concerns in the greyer areas of their 
jobs. 
Similar Techniques Between Scenarios  
As stated above, one interesting result of this research was that regardless of the 
scenario being presented, the Social Engineers’ processes for gathering information did 
not change. Of the eight participants, when asked how they would proceed in a second, or 
third scenario, all either stated explicitly that there would be no differences in the 
information gathering or described the same process again. The only noticeable 
difference wasn’t in the technique used for searching, but instead in the amount of 
information required before moving to the next step.  For example, one participant, when 
asked about scenario three, said he would “combine phishing and phone calls”. This type 
of explanation was common amongst all participants. When the scenario focused only on 
emailing, then the information required to target an individual would be limited to their 
personal interests, contact information, and possibly an event (within the company or 
from the media) that would spark their interest. For the scenario that required a phone call 
however, they also needed a business number for the victim as well as, in many cases, the 
name of someone from IT that they could use as a cover story for the call. The techniques 
used to gather this additional information, however, did not change.  
While the initial intent of this research was to detail the different scenarios and 
walk through how a Social Engineer might complete each one differently, the data did 
not show any marked differences between the four scenarios. Three types of search 
methods were identified: social media searching, using a search engine, and the use of 
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specialized tools and websites. It is important to note as well that individual techniques 
did vary slightly between participants, just not between scenarios for individual 
participants.  
Most Common Scenarios 
Each participant, after answering the initial scenario question, was asked to 
describe their most commonly complete Social Engineering scenario. This question was 
open ended and none of the participant’s answers fell within the scope of the researchers 
prepared scenarios. Upon initial review of the participants’ responses to their most 
common scenarios, they seemed to vary widely. Ultimately, they can be broken down 
into two groups of similar scenarios: 1) scenarios focusing on external businesses, and 2) 
internal “wide-net” phishing.  
In the case of business-related reconnaissance, the data retrieved was used either 
to learn more about a business contact or check on the vulnerability status of a newly 
purchased company. In these scenarios the goal of the information gathering was 
different, as there was no intent to exploit anyone, however the information was gathered 
in the exact same way. For example, one participant stated that one his primary duties 
included researching other businesses that a customer may be interested in partnering 
with. His process was nearly identical to another participants process for identifying 
targets within an organization.   
Internal “wide-net” phishing is a process in which Social Engineers send non-
targeted emails to a large audience hoping that some will still click. The concept here is 
quantity over quality. In these scenarios, the Social Engineer attempts to get some 
percentage, typically 10-25%, of a user base to fall victim to their phishing email. In this 
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case the Social Engineer is not using data specific to the victim, like he/she would in 
spear phishing, but instead is using current events within the company or news to elicit a 
response. A common example of this among participants was the use of shipping requests 
during the holidays.  One scenario that bordered the line between scenario groups was the 
scenario of targeting newly acquired subsidiaries. In this scenario a participant’s 
company merges with and acquires smaller companies his primary job is to perform 
social engineering on the new employees in order to identify gaps in their security 
posture. Ultimately, since the participant actually targeted a business that his employer 
now owned it was considered an internal instead of external focused scenario. An 
interesting internal “wide-net” phishing scenario was the attempt to get malware on the 
company systems. This is interesting because it would require more safety measures to 
ensure vulnerabilities introduced by the ethical hacker are not then used for nefarious 
reasons. One participant mentioned the risk of inadvertently attacking bring your own 
device (BYOD) systems as well, which makes the use of malware even more dangerous. 
Table 3 shows a breakdown of participants’ responses.  
Table 3: Common Scenarios 
Scenario Group Each Participant’s Most Common Scenario  
External Business Focus Information on a potential business partner 
Information on a business contact 
 
Internal “wide-net” Phish Targeting low level users at a business  
Large scale non-targeted phish of a business 
Get “malware” on company systems 
Targeting a newly acquired subsidiary 
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Social Engineering Search Tools 
Throughout the interview process, the participants described using three types of 
tools: social media searching, the use of search engines, and the use of specialized tools 
specific to hacking. These tools were used at varying levels by the participants with most 
focusing more on social media. All eight participants used social media, seven 
participants used some type of search engine, and six participants used specialized tools. 
Social Media Searching 
The primary search method of all participants was the use of social media to 
gather information. This included primarily the searching of commonly used websites 
such as Facebook and LinkedIn, but some participants stated they would attempt to 
correlate as many profiles as possible in order to get the most complete data on their 
targets. Primarily Facebook was used to confirm identities, gather information on 
interests, and look for additional contacts. One interesting example of misusing a 
“helpful” feature was shown when a participant used the reset password option of 
Facebook in order to gain partial information about a target’s email accounts. Facebook 
provided all email addresses associated with the account and masked them by replacing 
characters with asterisks. This form of masking is effective in keeping the average person 
from guessing contact information; however, the participant cross referenced these email 
addresses to those he discovered in Maltego in order to find one with matching length 
and known character set. LinkedIn was used similarly; however, instead of searching for 
information on interests a large focus was placed on identifying roles within the 
organization to decide on a target. 
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Search Engines 
The most commonly used search engine among participants was of Google. Many 
used it in the traditional way, searching for a company website or information about a 
business. Google led the participants to company websites where they could retrieve 
contact information and emails. Additionally, some of the automated tools discussed in 
the section below use Google searches in order to gather information. Outside of Google, 
some participants used people search engines to discover and refine data. Three people 
search engines were used: Spokeo(http://www.spokeo.com/), PIPL(https://pipl.com/), and 
White Pages. These sites aggregate not only information on social media but public 
information such as age and location. They allow a Social Engineer to not only get more 
personal data on a target but also allow him/her to refine their user data and eliminate 
false matches between targets’ social media profiles. The one participant who did not use 
search engines explicitly instead relied on specialized tools, as seen below. These tools 
however, have built in search engine and web scraping capabilities.  
Specialized tools/Websites 
In addition to the two tools mentioned in the literature review, Paterva’s Maltego 
and Michael Bazzell’s OSINT tool, two additional specialized tools were identified 
during the research: the Discovery Tool in Kali Linux (https://www.kali.org/) and Tim 
Tome’s Recon-ng (https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng). The main 
commonality between all four of these tools is that they bring together multiple searching 
tools in one place; they allow users, from a single location, to search for social media 
profiles, websites, email addresses, etc. Additionally, other than the OSINT tool, the tools 
automate the searching process and can aggregate data from multiple sources and store 
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them locally. The information returned from these automated searches is often extremely 
robust but can contain a lot of unnecessary data. This falls directly in line with the search 
strategy, however, as it allows the Social Engineer to perform discovery rapidly and then 
focus in on refinement. Below (Figure 2) is a screenshot of one participant loading up the 
Kali Linux discovery tool.  
 
Figure 2: Kali Linux Discovery Tool 
 
Social Engineer Search Strategies 
The three main search techniques used by participants were searching social 
media profiles, such as Facebook and LinkedIn; using search engines such as Google and 
White Pages; and using specialized tools and websites. The starting and ending tool for 
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the different participants varied; however, they all used social media and Google with six 
of the eight also mentioning the use of hacker-specific tools and websites.  
All participants seemed to use a semi-structured cyclic approach to their 
information with two defined steps: information discovery and information refinement 
(see Figure 3). The participants would typically start with the tool of their choice (for 
many it was Google while some preferred specialized tools) and “gather as much 
information as [they] could”. From there they would focus in on the information that 
seemed valuable to them and take that information and input it into another searching 
mechanism. 
 
Figure 3: Social Engineer Search Model 
The process is defined as semi-structured for two reasons: 1) there did not appear 
to be any preset criteria for deciding when the cycle was complete, other than when the 
participant felt they had enough information, and 2) the cycle seemed to be more 
dependent on what type of information was found as opposed to a preset, rigid process. 
Information 
Discovery 
Relationship 
Building 
Information 
Refinement 
31 
 
 
 
Tables 4-6 below shows the processes as explained by three different participants. These 
tables demonstrate the three approaches to the cycle most commonly seen:  
 Table 4 depicts a relatively pure cycle with a focus on discovering data, 
refining the data and then discovering again based on refinement.  
 Table 5 depicts a strategy based primarily on discovery with limited 
refinement.  
 Table 6 depicts a process where the discovery phase is completed first and as 
much information as possible is gathered with refinement following after 
sufficient amounts of data have been recalled.  
Table 4: Rotating Cycle 
Step Process Method 
Discovery Searched for user using inteltechniques.com’s 
Facebook search 
 
Specialized Website 
Refinement Found Facebook profile and recorded useful 
information interests, potential email addresses, etc 
  
Social Media Searching 
Discovery Input email data into Maltego to discover possible 
email addresses 
 
Specialized Tool 
Refinement Googled email addresses  
 
Search Engines 
Refinement Searched email addresses on PIPL 
 
Search Engines 
Refinement Searched for associated LinkedIn account 
 
Social Media Searching 
 
Table 5: Discovery-Focused Cycle 
Step Process Method 
Discovery Searched Google business to get employment 
information, company email addresses, and 
associated company social media sites 
 
Search Engines 
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Step Process Method 
Discovery Used Maltego to generate additional email addresses 
and social media sites 
 
Specialized Tool 
Refinement Correlated email and facebook data to narrow down 
the list to only legitimate company Facebook 
accounts 
 
Social Media Searching 
Discovery Found company intranet site HR data 
 
Search Engines 
 
 
Table 6: Sequential Cycle 
Step Process Method 
Discovery Found company webpage and looked for any useful 
information about the company 
 
Search Engines 
Discovery Looked for employees on company Facebook page 
 
Social Media Searching 
Refinement Found user on multiple social media sites to correlate 
accounts 
 
Social Media Searching 
Refinement Searched user on Spokeo 
 
Search Engines 
Refinement Searched user on whitepages.com 
 
Search Engines 
 
Ethical Concerns 
One of the primary concerns with this research was due to the limitations of 
Social Engineers from a legal and ethical perspective. A big difference between ethical 
hackers and the cybercriminals they emulate is the requirement to do no harm. Scenarios 
two and four were selected to test the Social Engineers’ willingness to perform the 
potentially unethical tasks of targeting personal assets, emails and personnel that did not 
belong to the company.  
Surprisingly, of the eight participants, only three explicitly mentioned not 
performing tasks due to ethics or legality. Their reasons included: staying within the legal 
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boundaries or “scope” of the engagement, stating that business owners didn’t have any 
right to target personal emails, and that targeting family members would be unethical and 
it was the obligation of the ethical hacker to say so and refuse. One interesting similarity 
among the three participants whose responses involved ethical concerns was that they all 
had experience performing penetration testing for the military. One participant, when 
asked in a follow-on conversation about why he did not express ethical concerns, stated 
that he assumed that the business who hired him would not ask for any illegal actions to 
be performed on their employees and also stated that, since he did not have “nefarious 
intentions,” he did not mind working in the greyer areas. This falls in line with another 
participant who, while he did not explicitly mention ethical or legal concerns, stated that 
he, as a white hat hacker, “only used [his] powers for good”. 
Summary of Results 
The results of this research began to define how Social Engineers gather 
information during the reconnaissance phase of their attacks. It found that, regardless of 
the scenario, the same tools and techniques were used by individual Social Engineers. 
The research also found that, while there was plenty of diversity in what they define as 
the most common scenario, participants most often performed a wide-net, non-targeted 
phishing attack.  
When performing their searches participants followed a semi-structured, cyclic 
approach and three cycle types were identified. Within the cycle it was found that 
participants used three primary types of source: social media, search engines, and 
specialized tools. All participants used some form of social media, and only one did not 
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explicitly use a search engine although that participants tools automated search engine 
searching for him.  
Ethics played a role in the participants answers to the questions however their 
reasoning and response varied. One participant stated legal concerns, one discussed the 
responsibility of the Ethical Hacker to work within ethical limits, and one voiced a 
personal concern that business owner had no right to make an unethical request. Others 
did not voice any ethical concerns based on the fact that their Social Engineering was 
being done without malice and with consent. 
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Discussion 
Implications for Social Engineers  
One of the most important implications of this research is the idea that Social 
Engineers generally use the same searching tools and techniques to locate information on 
their targets as ELIS social searchers. The same way that Lampe, Ellison, and Steinfeld 
(2006) found that college students often use social media sites to “get information about 
people that live in [their] dorm, fraternity, or sorority” (169). Social Engineers are using 
the same social searching techniques to gather information about targets they do not 
know. The same study found that respondents “reported high confidence that their 
Facebook portrayals described them accurately” (168) which means that the information 
that the Social Engineers retrieve will be useful and accurate. Additionally, the use of 
people search engines such as white pages and PIPL showed that even seemingly 
innocuous information, when aggregated properly, can lead to a much bigger threat.  
Since most techniques used by Social Engineers to gather information are the 
same ones used in everyday life potential Social Engineers should focus on two things: 
Anyone new to the field of Social Engineering, when developing their information search 
strategies, should focus on two things: practicing the use of specialized tools and finding 
the ones that are best for them, and establishing their best fit search cycle. This will allow 
the Social Engineer to hone skills that he does not already have, and make the searching 
through vast amounts of information more structured.  
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Implications for Potential Victims 
In order to limit the attack surface that can be leveraged against them, individuals 
should focus on controlling how much information about themselves is available to the 
public. While they cannot easily control websites like White Pages, they should ensure 
that their own social media profiles have strong privacy settings and they are only 
accepting people who they know. In terms of privacy settings individuals should share 
only the information needed to positively identify them on their public profile. This 
should ideally be limited to their name and profile picture (if applicable). This will keep 
Social Engineers from being able to identify key information about them such as their 
employer, and their interests which can be used against them. Additionally best practice 
would be to set social media contacts as private as well, this will keep attackers from 
adding your friends in an attempt to build trust around you.  
This technique, however, while protecting against spear phishing will be less 
effective against the more common wide-net phishing attacks. For wide-net phishing it is 
important that businesses limit the amount of business specific data that is available from 
the public internet. This can be difficult because a business will want to make it easy for 
potential customers to find them but also because they want to make it easy for 
employees to get to pertinent information. The use of two-factor authentication for 
accessing internal documents and/or the use of a company virtual private network (VPN) 
would help limit risk.  
Limitations 
The first limitation of this study was that it was exploratory in nature. 
Consequently, the research itself was not as grounded in theory and was the results 
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allowed for interpretation. Additionally, since the responses needed to be open ended, 
and analyze individually, a small sample size was used for the research.  
A second limitation of this research is that it was conducted on ethical hackers 
instead of actual cybercriminals. While this limited the experience of the participants, in 
that many had not attempted to target personal emails and families, it did not affect the 
findings. Since there was very little deviation in search strategies regardless of scenario, 
it is somewhat unlikely that the passive reconnaissance phase would be different for 
cybercriminals. Nevertheless, caution should be exercised in generalizing these findings 
to cybercriminal searching behaviors. 
Another limitation of this study was the sample. Since convenience sampling was 
used, the participants were not as diverse as would have been preferred. One participant 
stated, when discussing a scenario similar to scenario two from his own experience, that 
“people sympathize more with women”. He described a situation where a female Social 
Engineer used an audio recording of a baby crying to get sympathy and was able to elicit 
information from a customer service representative about her target. It is possible that 
female Social Engineers have a different process than males or perhaps some other 
demographic may have been a variable in search techniques. 
Since this research was conducted in such a way as to minimize risk to the 
participants and the general public, the searching was also slightly unrealistic. 
Participants could not target specific companies for whom they had worked in the past 
unless they had prior permission, and were limited to targeting the researcher in terms of 
an individual, but not the researcher’s employer. While this did not stop the participants 
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from walking through the steps of their process it did make it less realistic and more 
disjoint at times.   
Future Research 
Future research should focus on further exploring Social Engineer search 
strategies with a more structured interview process. Ideally a fake business with a fake 
user base would be set up to allow the participant a safe and ethical set of targets on 
which to demonstrate their techniques. This research should be conducted on participants 
with larger demographic differences to allow for some correlation between traits and 
techniques. Additionally, an open-ended questionnaire could be sent to ethical hackers 
with Social Engineering experience in order to get a more robust listing of the tools they 
use. While this questionnaire would not provide the rich data that contextual interviews 
might, it would allow greater insight into how Social Engineers misuse publicly available 
tools to gather information.  
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Conclusion 
This research sought to identify information search strategies used by Social 
Engineers by first defining Social Engineering through current literature and exploring 
information currently available about hacker information seeking strategies and everyday 
life information seeking/social search. Using that information as a starting point and 
interviewing eight Social Engineers, the following five key points came out of the 
research  
1. There exists no noticeable difference between how different Social Engineers 
search for information between scenarios.  
2. Social Engineer search strategies can be defined as a semi-structured cyclic 
approach to their information with two primary steps: data discovery and data 
refinement.  
3. The primary search tools used by Social Engineers could be grouped into three 
types: social media, search engines, and specialized tools/websites.  
4. There was a wide array of “most common scenarios.” However, they could be 
grouped into two main categories: scenarios focused on external business 
contacts, and scenarios targeting employees via business emails.  
5. Ethics and legality played a role in what some social engineers were willing to do. 
However, not all of them had the same concerns in the greyer areas of their jobs. 
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This research added to the current field by identifying key similarities and 
difference between ELIS social search and the search strategies of social engineers. It laid 
the groundwork for future research by identifying areas that require greater focus as well 
provided recommendations for more robust future research.   
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Appendix A: Interview Guide  
Begin with the verbal consent form (in Appendix B). This will introduce you and the 
research.  
I am going to present you with a couple scenarios and ask that you show me how you 
would gather information to complete the tasks in each one. For the first scenario assume 
that you have been hired by a business to perform a penetration test and you are 
attempting to craft a spear phishing email targeting a specific user’s business email. How 
would you gather information in this situation? 
As the participant walks through this process be sure to ask for further details on any 
steps that he/she does not explain fully. Take note of any assumptions they make or 
questions they ask of you. After they have completed this task move on to the next.  
Next I want you to think of the most common Social Engineering scenario that you see at 
work. Can you describe that scenario to me and walk through your workflow for 
completing this task? 
If the participant says that their most common scenario was the one shown already ask 
them to perform another scenario from the list below. As the participant walks through 
this process be sure to ask for further details on any steps that he/she does not explain 
fully. Take note of any assumptions they make or questions they ask of you. 
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Additional scenarios:  
1. Assume that you have been hired by a business to perform a penetration test 
and you are attempting craft a spear phishing email targeting a person’s personal email. 
2. Assume that you have been hired by a business to perform a penetration test 
and you are attempting attempt to gain a person’s business credentials via the phone. 
3. Assume that you have been hired by a business to perform a penetration test 
and you are attempting gather information about a person in order to target a family 
member. 
As the participant walks through this process be sure to ask for further details on any 
steps that he/she does not explain fully. Take note of any assumptions they make or 
questions they ask of you. After they have completed this task move on to the next.  
Thank you so much for your participating in my research. Is there any else regarding 
passive information gathering that you would like to add? Would you be willing to be 
contacted with follow-up questions? Can you suggest a peer or colleague in the field for 
me to interview next? If yes ask if they would be willing to forward the recruitment 
information.  
Immediately following the interview, review the video and take additional notes.  
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Appendix B: Verbal Consent Form 
Hello, my name is Lester Smith I am a student from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill conducting research about information search strategies for social engineers.  
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  This means that you do not 
have to participate in this research unless you want to. 
 
Would you be willing to answer some questions to help me determine if you are eligible 
for this study?  (If yes, proceed; if no thank them for their time and end the call). 
 
Thank you.  
 
Do you have ethical hacking experience that includes passive reconnaissance for the 
purpose of social engineering? (If yes, proceed; if no thank them for their time and end 
the call). 
 
Were you able to review the information fact sheet prior to this call? (If yes, ask if they 
have any questions or concerns and answer any that they provide; if no proceed to the 
interview description) 
 
Interview Description 
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The purpose of this research study is to explore the methods in which ethical hackers 
gather the information they need for social engineering. For this study the research will 
be limited to the passive reconnaissance phase. The study focuses on person to person 
search in order to identify commonalities between everyday social search and searches 
done for social engineering purposes. 
 
We estimate that approximately 7-10 participants will enroll in this study.  During the 
interview, you will be asked to demonstrate your process for information gathering based 
on a presented scenario and a scenario of your choice. We’ll use the screen sharing 
feature in GoToMeeting, so that I can see exactly what you’re doing while you explain it. 
 
There is a small chance that some of the questions may make you feel uncomfortable.  
You don't have to answer those questions if you don't want to.  In fact you don't have to 
answer any question that you choose not to answer.  And that is fine.  We will just skip 
that question and go on to the next one. We can pause or stop the recording at any time at 
your request however, all data that will be included in the research will be recorded. 
 
All the information I receive from you by phone, including your name and any other 
identifying information, will be strictly confidential and will be kept under lock and key.  
I will not identify you or use any information that would make it possible for anyone to 
identify you in any presentation or written reports about this study.  If it is okay with you, 
I might want to use direct quotes from you, but these would only be quoted as coming 
from "a person" or a person of a certain label or title, like "one woman said." When I 
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finish with all the interviews from everyone who has agreed to participate, I will group all 
the answers together in any report or presentation. There will be no way to identify 
individual participants. 
The only risk to you might be if your identity were ever revealed.  But I will not even 
record your name with your responses, so this cannot occur.  There are no other expected 
risks to you for helping me with this study. There are also no expected benefits for you 
individually.  Once the research is complete the final results can be shared, via email, by 
request.  
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
You can also call me at 9102805612 with questions about the research study.  All 
research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
subject you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 
919-966-3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
You are considered an expert in your field so there are no wrong answers. During the 
interview, you will be asked to show how you would complete a task remember to focus 
on how you actually complete the task and feel free to define verbally any tasks, or the 
use of any tools, that you cannot demonstrate during the interview. Do I have your 
permission to begin asking you questions?
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Appendix C: Glossary of Terms 
  Attribution – Finding where an attack originated from 
  Backdoors – Unauthorized entry points into computing systems 
  Bot – Automated computing “robot” 
  Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) – Process in which businesses allow users to user 
their own devices on the company network 
  Cyber Threat Actors – A person or group that commits cyber crimes 
  Cybercrime – crimes involving computers or conducted over the internet 
  Dumpster Diving – The act of going through discarded items in order to gather 
unauthorized information,  
  Ethical Hackers – Individuals certified to emulate cyber criminals in order to increase 
a customer’s security posture 
  Hackerspaces – Online spaces where hackers gather 
  Inheritance Factor – Something you are (biometric factor)  
  Kali Linux – Unix based operation system that aggregates multiple hacker tools into a 
single suite 
  Knowledge Factor – Something you know such as a pin 
  Malicious Software – Software designed to do harm to a computing system 
  Maltego – Forensics and data mining application   
  Malware – See malicious software 
  Mass Phishing – Phishing intended to hit a large audience 
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  Non-targeted Phish – See Mass Phishing 
  Open Source Information – Information that is publicly available  
  Phishing – The process through which someone gains unauthorized access to a 
system or information by posing as an authorized individual online 
  PIPL – Online people search engine 
  Possession Factor – Something you have such as an smart card 
  Recon-NG – Forensics and data mining application   
  Shoulder Surfing – Watching over another person’s shoulder in order to gain 
unauthorized information  
  Social Engineering Attack Cycle – Sequence of events for a social engineering attack 
  Spear-phishing – Phishing attacks that target a specific person or group 
  Spokeo – Online people search engine 
  Two-Factor Authentication – Authentication that uses two of the three factors: 
knowledge factors, possession factors, and inheritance factors. 
  Virtual Private Networks(VPN) – Allows users outside of a network to connect to 
internal resources by having their traffic encrypted over the internet 
  Viruses – Malware capable of copying itself 
  White-Hat Hacker – See ethical hacker 
  Wide-net Phishing – See Mass Phishing 
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